To read this text, "Croatia: Manufacturing the politics of moderation since 1995" in English, please scroll down. Ovaj tekst je napisan kao potreba za detaljnjijim promišljanjem trenutačne društvene i političke situacije u Hrvatskoj. Ta potreba se čini još urgentnijom uslijed gotovo sistematskog nedostatka ozbiljnih analiza prosvjeda u Hrvatskoj.
Uslijed nevjerovatnog nedostatka izvještavanja od strane inozemnih medija o prosvjedima diljem Hrvatske, pažnja se neizbjezno usmjerava na rastuće lokalne diskurse o “prosvjedima”, “stabilnosti” i “redu” na Balkanu.
U proteklih šest dana, građani Hrvatske su protestirali svaki drugi dan u gradovima diljem zemlje, zahtijevajući smjenu trenutne vladajuće koalicije. Premda su prosvjedi inicijalno započeli okupljanjem ratnih veterana, ohrabrenih nastupima nekolicine desničarskih političara i “zvijezda”, sami ratni veterani su se podijelili oko podrške vladajućoj HDZ-ovoj vladi . Naoko trivijalno razmimoilaženje unutar ovog bloka, koji je konzistentno glasao za HDZ, izazvalo je poplavu pitanja usmjerenih ka programima čitavog spektra političkih stranaka u ovoj iznimno maloj, ali isto tako iznimno korumpiranoj balkanskoj državi.
Nakon inicijalnog prosvjeda, braniteljima su se pridružili nezaposleni radnici – kako oni sa, tako i oni bez diploma – zaposleni radnici, poljoprivredinici, ribari, penzioneri, studenti, lijevo orijentirani političari poput Damira Kajina i Dragutina Lesara te veliki broj obespravljenih i opljačkanih građana sa ciljem da protestiraju ne samo protiv poteza vlade, nego uopće protiv načina na koji su se vladajuće strukture i građani međusobno odnosili u godinama od kraja rata, 1995. U znak protesta protiv čitave klase vladajućih elita, prosvjednici su u srijedu navečer zapalili ne samo zastavu vladajućeg HDZ-a nego i glavne opozicione partije, SDP-a.
Mnogi hrvatski političari su ishitreno zaključili da se u ovom slučaju može govoriti o djelovanju “radikalnih” ili “ekstremnih” elemenata među prosvjednicima, dok su se strani komentatori zabrinuli oko desničarskih ili fašističkih implikacija ovih nastupa. I naravno, istina je da hrvatski građani itekako trebaju puno poraditi na vlastitom suočavanju sa nacionalizmom i govorom mržnje. Međutim, paljenja zastava su u ovom slučaju bila ključna iz upravo drugačijih razloga: ona su naime sugerirala novu i posebnu vrstu solidarnosti među prosvjednicima i kao takva nisu imala ništa zajedničkog sa eventualnim savezništvom sa suvremenom hrvatskom politikom. To je prije svega bila klasna solidarnost i prepoznavanje iste kao nečega što nadvisuje druge vrste podjela. Što vise, paljenje zastava nije bilo upućeno samo protiv političkih elita u Hrvatskoj kao takvih, nego protiv činjenice da su u Hrvatskoj političke elite postale sinonim klasnih elita. U Hrvatskoj je već postala uobičajena šala koja ide otprilike ovako: sin kaže majci: “ Mama, kad odrastem, ja ću biti bogat i darovat ću ti puno poklona, putovati ću posvuda, upoznati ću zvijezde, družiti se sa nogometašima i živjeti u dvorcu.” Majka reče na to: “Pa šta ćeš ti onda biti kad odrasteš?” “Političar,” odgovara sin.
Prosvjednici su također naglašavali rastrošni i raskalašeni životni stil mnogih hrvatskih političara. Prošlotjedno otkriće da je Ivo Sanader, bivši premijer Hrvatske, koji trenutno čeka da bude procesuiran zbog afere Hypo banke u Austriji, primio proviziju u visini od 3,5 miliona hrvatskih kuna u pregovorima sa istom bankom, učinilo je puno više nego bilo koja druga afera na konsolidiranju saveza među prosvjednicima. Ti savezi su kreirani putem novinskih web stranica, Facebook-a, Twitter-a, razgovora sa sugrađanima na ulici, kao i telefonskih poziva među članovima obitelji. Unatoč tomu što mediji u Hrvatskoj izvještavaju da prosvjednici nemaju nikakav jasan plan niti cilj, poprilično se jasnom čini klasna orijentacija protesta. Tokom prosvjeda koji su uslijedili nakon inicijalnih prosvjeda ratnih veterana, natpisi i plakati koje su nosili prosvjednici nisu imali ništa drugo do ekonomske statistike, ličnih iskustava, cijene hrane i prezira prema izabranim dužnosnicima.
Zvaničan broj od 350 000 nezaposlenih u Hrvatskoj ne uključuje desetine tisuća zaposlenih koji čekaju ili još nisu primili plaću u proteklih šest mjeseci; ne uključuje desetine tisuća onih koji su plaćeni kombinacijom novca i bonova koje moraju potrošiti u određenoj trgovini i u određenom vremenskom roku; ne uključuje niti činjenicu da mnoge obitelji imaju jedan ili nemaju prihoda uopće; ne odražava činjenicu da mirovine nisu dosta visoke da bi se od njih živjelo, te većina umirovljenika postaje ovisnima o svojoj djeci za financijsku podršku. Ovaj broj također prikriva činjenicu da je priliv mirovinskih čekova i invalidnina prilično neredovan; prikriva rastuću kreditnu krizu u zemlji u kojoj je ostao vrlo mali broj garantora za nevjerovatno veliki broj kreditnih ugovora, koji su tako neodgovorno podijeljeni od stranih banaka.
Početkom prošlog tjedna premijerka Jadranka Kosor susrela se sa predstavnicima velikih tvrtki, uključujući Agrokor i Dukat, da bi se “pobrinula” kako cijene osnovnih živežnih namirnica ne bi rasle. Međutim, ovo uvjeravanje neće predstavljati ništa posebno velikom broju ljudi koji već I nisu u stanju nositi se sa zelenaškom ekonomijom prehrambenih proizvoda (niti će učiniti mnogo za problem pretjerano nabujalog struka kod mnogih hrvatskih političara).
Neki su povezali proteste u Hrvatkoj i rastuće proteste na Bliskom Istoku i u Sjevernoj Africi, ali puno je važnije staviti sve ove proteste i ustanke u veći kontekst ekonomskih programa, međunarodne geopolitike i financija u (barem) zadnjih 20 godina.
Iako su međunarodni mediji jedva dotakli trenutnu situaciju u Hrvatskoj, lokalne novine su preplavljene izjavama vladinih dužnosnika (začudo, najmanji broj izjava dolazi od premijerke Jadranke Kosor, koja je ujedno i najveća meta ovih prosvjeda). Glavni trend ovih izjava je bilo pozivanje na «red» i «umjerenost» i kontinuirano karakteriziranje prosvjednika od strane HDZ-ovih zvaničnika «huliganima» i «onima koji izazivaju probleme.» Početkom prošlog tjedna član HDZ-a i bivši predsjednički kandidat Andrija Hebrang optužio je oporbu da je plaćala prosvjednike po 250 kuna sa ciljem da proteste liše njihovog mirnog karaktera. Predsjednik oporbenog SDP-a, Zoran Milanović neprestano ponavlja kako “ Mi nismo Libija, ne želimo predaju vlasti na ulici.” No, ono što je bilo zajedničko svim ovim izjavama je perfidna i zamaskirana javna prijetnja, promovirana od strane širokog spektra političkih aktera, a koja se sastoji u konstatiranju da će ovi prosvjedi ugroziti prijem Hrvatske u EU. Prekjučer je Milanović ponovno zavikao kako “Pregovore sa EU treba zaključiti, svi znamo koja je dinamika prema tom cilju.”
Zamaskirane prijetnje prijemom u EU su obično išle ruku pod ruku sa nagovještajima još gore ekonomske situacije. Ministar turizma Damir Bajs je upozorio javnost da sa protestima ugrožavaju predstojeću potencijalno obećavajuću turističku sezonu. On je izjavio da «Nema mnogo upita stranih novinara [o situaciji u zemlji] i nadamo se da će tako ostati. Daleko smo od Grčke i situacija nije alarmantna. Nadamo se da će tako i ostati.» Potpredsjednik vlade Domagoj Ivan Milošević u brifingu za novinare je rekao da prosvjedi u kojima dolazi do sukoba s policijom jako loše utječu na investicijsku klimu. A nastavio uvjeravati da uskoro ulazimo i u EU, a sve to, prosvjedi bi mogli usporiti.
Zahtjevi za stabilnost i ekonomskim uspjehom, te odgovori na klasne nedaće već su puno godina bili izjednačavani u Hrvatskoj sa pitanjem prijema u Europsku Uniju. Od početka vlade Ive Sanadera, HDZ (uz oporbu) brutalno je forsirao pristup u EU po svaku cijenu, i istovremeno je to koristio kao odgovor na sve političke, ekonomske i socijalne probleme u Hrvatskoj. Svi vladini dužnosnici pribjegvali su upotrebi jezika reda, napretka, razvoja i, što je najvažnije, umjerenosti u ostvarivanju ovog cilja. Slično, sve dominantne partije Europskog Parlamenta su snažile ovaj jezik njihovim teleološkim narativima o prijemu u EU.
Potpisivanje Daytonskog mirovnog ugovora 1995. moglo bi se okarakterizirati kao kulminacija višegodišnjih intervencija i humanitarizma u regiji, ali jednako tako, i kao početak specifičnih narativa o državnosti. Hrvatska naravno nije jedinstvena u regiji time što je označena kao država u “tržišnoj tranziciji” koja bježi od socijalizma i nastaje raspadom Jugoslavije, te se kao post-konfliktna država u “tranziciji” primiče kosmopolitskom profilu EU članica. Dakako o svim državama bivše Jugoslavije se diskutiralo unutar ideološkog okvira društvene i političke zrelosti europske obitelji s jedne, i balkanskih “problema u razvoju” i njegove periferne pozicije u odnosu na EU, s druge strane. U svojoj izjavi da su prosvjednici “uvrijedili Zagreb svojim divljaštvom,” Ivo Josipović se na nevjerovatan način pridružuje Jadranki Kosor koja je u govoru od prije nekoliko dana prigodom otvaranja skupa Europske pučke stranke (EPP) izjavila sljedeće: “Obavit ćemo svoj posao i ponosno s uzdignutim čelom ući ćemo u Europsku uniju i vratiti se kući, odnosno svom europskom civilizacijskom krugu.” Oboje su pri tom implicitno usporedili trenutno “primitivno” i “nazadno” hrvatsko društvo (koje kao takvo dakle nipošto nije dijelom “europske civilizacije”), gotovo mesijanskim mogućnostima koje nude “kulturni” europski faktori.
Cilj ove kratke digresije nije bila apologija i promoviranje nasilnog ponašanja među prosvjednicima. Naprotiv, demonstracije su do sad bile iznimne upravo zbog svog miroljubivog karaktera. U srijedu su prosvjednici bacali tulipane pred noge zagrebačkim policajcima uzvikujući “mi vas volimo.” Prije svega, ja želim ukazati kako se jezik umjerenosti, reda, progresa i kulture uopće ne poklapa sa onim što su karakterizirali Asli Bali i Aziz Rana u članku “Lažna umjerenost američkih najumjerenijih saveznika” za Foreign Policy in Focus, kao “bilo kakva opipljiva posvećenost trenutnoj moderaciji (promoviranju umjerenosti) shvaćenoj kao unutarnji projekt demokratizacije ili političke otvorenosti.” Otkako je izdata obavijest da će se prosvjedi održavati svakog dana dok vlada ne da ostavku, prosvjedi su dobili upravo na onim kvalitetama koje su do nebesa uzdizane od strane umjerenih pro-zapadnih struja: dosljedno usmjeravanje pažnje prema ljudskim pravima i isticanje prava većine da bira svoje predstavnike.
Ovi događaji u Hrvatskoj i reakcije na njih podvlače ono što su Bali i Rana nazvali “promašenosti” dihotomije red-kaos kao okvira pomoću kojeg bismo trebali razumjeti događaje u Hrvatskoj. Dihotomija red-kaos je bila više nego komplementarna za poigravanje strahom građana da se ne spotaknu o tzv. atavistički konflikt, kao i strahom od toga da Hrvatska možda nikada neće uživati “stabilnost” koja bi bila osigurana ulaskom u geopolitičko igralište obećano od strane NATO i EU. Ali iznad svega, dihotomija kaos-red je bila najvažnija za instaliranje i proizvodnju umjerenih političara u godinama što su usljedile nakon potpisivanja Dayton-a. Uspostavljajući se kao svjetlost umjerenosti, reda, progresa i ”kulture” i kao glasnogovornici EU članstva, umjereni političari efektivno osiguravaju i jačaju svoju vlastitu legitimnost u očima Europskih i ostalih “Zapadnih” sila. Istovremeno, legitimnost ponuđena umjerenim političarima od strane “Zapadnih sila” je diskurzivno onemogućila kritiku od strane populacije koje je obespravljena te značajno i sve više osiromašena. Unatoč njihovoj fasadi demokratizacije i diskursa o “lokalnim obavezama,” ove političke elite su kreirale državu koja je iznimno korumpirana i koja više ne može fiskalno podnositi krađe orkestrirane od strane tih istih političara. Ove elite su također kreirale i državni aparat koji se postavio u klasnu poziciju u kojoj se običan građanin više ne može pronaći i sa kojom se uopće ne može identificirati.
Paljenje EU zastave koje se desilo u srijedu navečer moglo bi se također tumačiti kao čin kojim su se građani suprotstavili legitimitetu naših političara koji su narativizirali proces pristupa EU. Oni naime za većinu hrvatskih građana predstavljaju ekstenziju Europskog legitimiteta u javnoj sferi.
Ono što povezuje slučaj Hrvatske sa ostalim protestima na Bliskom Istoku moglo bi se na najbolji način sumirati ne samo kao tranzicija od “autokracije” ka “demokraciji,” niti kao tranzicija od “socijalizma” ka “kapitalizmu.” Prije bi se moglo reći da je Hrvatska, zajedno sa ostalim državama bivše Jugoslavije, u proteklih 20 godina bila karakterizirana tranzicijom od desetljeća politike i načela nesvrstavanja (naravno, kroz Pokret Nesvrstanih) ka trenutnom “intervencijskom” svjetskom poretku, gdje lokalni lideri vladaju najduže (i sa najviše legitimiteta) ako slijede i promoviraju dominantnu (bilo pro europsku ili pro američku) geopolitičku crtu. Atmosfera umjerenosti i retoričkog talenta kod većine ovih lidera je služila uspješnom prikrivanju nesmiljenog razgrabljivanja nacionalnih rezervi, blaga, prirodnih resursa, industrije i života običnih građana.
U petak se preko 10000 prosvjednika okupilo u Zagrebu i njihov broj će vjerovatno porasti u nedjelju. Njihovi zahtijevi su daleko od “nejasnih” ili “neartikuliranih.” Naprotiv, njihovi zahtijevi su jasni - vladajuća struktura mora odstupiti. Premijerka i njen kabinet ministra moraju dati ostavke. Prijevremeni izbori se moraju održati, a nova era klasne politike te preusmjeravanje političkog fokusa na lokalne situacije mora biti prepoznata kako u Hrvatskoj tako i u široj regiji kao ključ za trajnu stabilnost.
Sabrina Perić je doktorski kandidat na odsjeku za socijalnu antropologiju, Sveučilište Harvard.
Saturday, March 5, 2011
Friday, March 4, 2011
Croatia: Manufacturing the politics of moderation since 1995
This short piece was written in response to the unbelievable lack of media coverage of the protests in Croatia, especially English-language media coverage.
The astonishing lack of international media coverage of protests across Croatia this past week has drawn attention to the growing domestic discourses on ‘protest’ ‘stability’ and ‘order’ in the Balkan region.
For the past six days, citizens all over Croatia have been demonstrating every other day in cities across the country, demanding the resignation of the current ruling government coalition. Though the protests originally started as a gathering of war veterans, bolstered by the appearance of several right-wing politicians and celebrities, the war veterans themselves have become fractionalized along the issue of support for the current ruling conservative HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) government. The seemingly trivial fractioning of this consistently HDZ-voting bloc though has opened the floodwaters to a questioning of the political programs of an entire spectrum of political parties in this very small yet very corrupt Balkan state.
Since Saturday, the veterans have been joined by unemployed workers – those both with and without postgraduate degrees, farmers, fishermen, pensioners, students, left-wing politicians such as Damir Kajin and Dragutin Lesar, and a slew of disenfranchised citizens to protest not only the actions of the ruling government, but the very way that government and citizens have engaged each other in the years since the end of the war in 1995. In an act of defiance towards the entire class of ruling elites, protesters on Wednesday night burned both the flag of the ruling HDZ party, as well as the flag of the main opposition SDP (Social Democratic Party of Croatia).
Many Croatian politicians have been quick to judge this as indexical of the ‘radical’ or ‘extremist’ elements at work amongst the protesters, outside commentators have worried about the structural ‘right-wing’ or ‘fascist’ implications of these acts. And it is true that the state of Croatia has much work to do in dealing with nationalism and hate speech amongst its citizens. These acts of flag burning however were key for exactly opposite reasons: they did signal a new and particular kind of solidarity amongst demonstrators, but it had nothing to do with a realignment of contemporary Croatian politics. Rather, it was a class solidarity, and a recognition of class solidarity above other kinds of divisions. Furthermore, the flag burning was directed not only against political elites in the state of Croatia, but against the fact that, in Croatia, political elites are synonymous with class elites. A common joke in Croatia goes along the following lines: a young boy says to his mom “Mom, when I grow up, I’m going to be rich and shower you with gifts, travel all over the place, meet celebrities and hang out with soccer players and live in a palace.” The mom says “Oh, and what will you be then when you grow up?” “A politician” answers the boy.
Protesters too have been quick to point out the lavish lifestyles of many of Croatia’s politicians. The discovery earlier this week that Ivo Sanader, former Croatian Prime Minister who is currently awaiting trial for the Hypo bank affair in Austria, received a commission of 3.5 million Croatian Kuna in the negotiations with Hypo, has done more than any one single affair to consolidate the loose alliances amongst protesters created via newspaper websites, Facebook pages, Twitter feeds, talk on the streets and phone calls between family members. Croatian media reports have come back to the claim that protesters do not have an agenda or an end goal, however, the class agenda here seems very clear. At the protests following Saturday’s initial veterans’ demonstrations, banners and posters held by participants in the cold Zagreb winter displayed only economics statistics, personal experiences, food prices and contempt for elected officials.
The number of 350 000 officially unemployed in Croatia masks the tens of thousands who are employed but have not received a salary in six months; it masks the tens of thousands who are paid in a combination of cash and ‘store credits’ that they have to spend at particular grocery stores by a certain date; it masks the fact that many families have either only one or no income; it masks the fact that pensions are not enough for pensioners to live off of, and therefore most become dependent on their children for financial support; it masks the irregular arrival of both pension and disability cheques; it masks the growing credit crisis in a country where very few guarantors are left to sign the astonishing number of loan contracts, handed out irresponsibly by foreign banks. At the beginning of the week, Prime Minister Kosor met with large food producing and processing corporations, including Agrokor and Dukat, to make sure prices of basic foodstuffs would not rise. However, this reassurance will not do much for the large number of people who already cannot support the already exorbitant food economy (nor will it do much for the Croatian politicians' ever-expanding and exorbitant waist lines).
Though some have drawn a line of connection between these protests in Croatia and the uprisings in progress in the North African and Middle East region, it is more important to put all of these protests and uprisings in the larger context of the economic programs, international geopolitics and financing of the (at least) past 20 years.
Though international media have barely touched the current situation in Croatia, domestic newspapers have been overflowing with statements from Croatia’s government officials (coincidentally, the fewest number of statements have come from the HDZ Prime Minister, Jadranka Kosor, who has been the most prominent target of demonstrators). The largest trend amongst these statements has been the call to ‘order’ and ‘moderation,’ and the simultaneous portrayal of protesters by HDZ officials, amongst others, as ‘hooligans’ and ‘troublemakers.’ Earlier this week, HDZ member and former presidential candidate Andrija Hebrang accused the opposition of paying each protester 250 Croatian Kuna to rid the protests of their peaceful character. The president of the opposition SDP, Zoran Milanović reiterated “we are not Libya, we will not hand over power in the streets.” Most common of all however has been an underhanded and veiled public threat promoted by a range of political actors that these protests will threaten Croatia’s European Union ascension bid. Yesterday Milanović reiterated “the talks with the EU must be finalized, we all know what the dynamic is towards that goal.”
The veiled threats over EU ascension have been coupled with foreshadowings of an even more grim general economic situation. Minister of Tourism Damir Bajs warned the public that they were endangering the upcoming potentially lucrative tourist season with their protests. He stated in public that “there have not been many questions from foreign news reporters, and let’s hope it stays that way.” Deputy Prime Minister Domagoj Ivan Milošević called reporters to a briefing and said that “protests affect the investment climate very negatively,” and continued to reiterate that “we will be entering the EU soon. All this might be slowed by the protests.”
The demand for stability, economic success and the answering of class grievances has for many years in Croatia been equated with the question of EU membership. Since the beginning of Ivo Sanader’s government, the HDZ has ruthlessly pursued EU membership at all costs, and as a remedy to all problems, political, economic and social, in Croatia. All government officials have resorted to the language of order, progress, incrementalism and, most importantly, moderation in pursuit of this goal. Similarly, all dominant parties in the European Parliament (EP) have reinforced this language through their own teleological narrative of EU ascension.
The signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995 might be marked both as the culmination of years of regional intervention and humanitarianism, but also the beginning of these particular narratives of statehood. Marked at first as a state ‘in market transition’ away from socialism following the collapse of Yugoslavia, then as a post-conflict state ‘in transition’ to the cosmopolitan profile of the EU members, Croatia’s position is not unique in the region. Indeed, all the former Yugoslav states have been discussed within the ideological framework of the social and political maturity of the European family of nations on the one hand, and of the Balkans’ developmental ‘handicaps’ and peripheral condition, at the edges of EU membership, on the other hand. In a stunning complement to Croatian President Ivo Josipović’s declaration that protesters “offended Zagreb with their savagery,” Jadranka Kosor, in her speech yesterday at the opening of the centrist-right European People’s Party Congress in the European Parliament stated that “we will do our job, and proudly, with head held-high, enter the European Union and return home to the circle of European Civilizations.” Both thereby implicitly contrasted current Croatian society as ‘primitive’ and ‘backwards,’ not a part of ‘European civilization,’ with the almost messianic possibilities offered by the ‘cultured’ European factors.
The purpose of this brief digression has not been to promote or justify violent behavior amongst protesters. To the contrary, the protests have been remarkable precisely for their peacefulness. On Wednesday, many protesters threw tulips at the feet of Zagreb riot police controlling the event, and chanted “we love you” in a chorus to the officers. Rather, my goal is to stress how politicians' language of moderation, order, progress, culture, and has been at odds with what Asli Bali and Aziz Rana in an article on “The Fake Moderation of America’s Moderate Mideast Allies” for ‘Foreign Policy in Focus’ call “any tangible commitment to actual moderation – understood as an internal project of democratization or political openness.” Since the announcement that there would be protests every other day until the government resigned, the protests have been characterized by the very qualities extolled by moderate pro-Western factions: a dedicated focus on human rights and the right of the majority to choose its elected officials.
These events in Croatia, and reactions to these events highlight what Bali and Rana call “the falseness” of the chaos-order dichotomy as the frame through which we must understand the events in Croatia. The chaos-order dichotomy has been more than complementary to both playing on citizens’ fears of a stumble back to so-called atavistic conflict, as well as the fear that Croatia may never enjoy the ‘stability’ ensured by entry into the geopolitical playground promised by NATO and the EU.
But more than anything, the chaos-order dichotomy has been most crucial for the installation and manufacture of politicians of ‘moderation’ in the years since Dayton. The politicians ‘of moderation’ have effectively, through their installation as the beacons of moderation and as harbingers of European membership, both assured and strengthened their own legitimacy in the eyes of European and “Western” powers. Simultaneously, the legitimacy offered to these politicians of moderation by “Western” powers has discursively prevented critique from a disenfranchised, increasingly impoverished population. Despite their façade of democratization and the discourse of ‘local commitments,’ these political elites have created a state that is extremely corrupt, that can no longer fiscally carry the theft its politicians have orchestrated, and a state apparatus that has placed itself in a class position that the average citizen cannot relate to.
The burning of the EU flag that took place on Wednesday night might then be read also as citizens taking a stand against the legitimacy of domestic politicians who have narrativized the EU ascension process, and who, for most of Croatia’s citizens, represent European legitimacy in the Croatian public sphere.
What brings together the Croatian case with other protests in the Middle East region might best be summarized not by the transition from ‘autocracy’ to ‘democracy’ nor by the transition from ‘socialism’ to ‘capitalism.’ Rather, Croatia, along with the other former Yugoslav states, has been, in the past 20 years characterized by the transition from decades of non-aligned policies and politics to the current ‘interventionist’ world order, where local rulers rule longest (and with most legitimacy) if they tow the dominant (whether it be Europeanist or Americanist) geopolitical line. The air of moderation and rhetorical talent of most of these leaders has for years masked the pillage of national treasures, treasuries’ reserves, natural resources, industry and individual citizens’ lives.
Right now, over 10000 protesters have gathered in Zagreb, and their numbers are growing even larger. Their demands are far from ‘hazy’ or ‘disarticulated.’ To the contrary, their demands are clear. The current ruling government must step down. The current prime minister and her cabinet must step down from their positions. Early elections need to be convened. And a new era of class politics, of realigned political concern to local situations, must be recognized in Croatia, and in the wider region as the key to long-term stability.
Sabrina Perić is a doctoral candidate in social anthropology at Harvard University.
The astonishing lack of international media coverage of protests across Croatia this past week has drawn attention to the growing domestic discourses on ‘protest’ ‘stability’ and ‘order’ in the Balkan region.
For the past six days, citizens all over Croatia have been demonstrating every other day in cities across the country, demanding the resignation of the current ruling government coalition. Though the protests originally started as a gathering of war veterans, bolstered by the appearance of several right-wing politicians and celebrities, the war veterans themselves have become fractionalized along the issue of support for the current ruling conservative HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) government. The seemingly trivial fractioning of this consistently HDZ-voting bloc though has opened the floodwaters to a questioning of the political programs of an entire spectrum of political parties in this very small yet very corrupt Balkan state.
Since Saturday, the veterans have been joined by unemployed workers – those both with and without postgraduate degrees, farmers, fishermen, pensioners, students, left-wing politicians such as Damir Kajin and Dragutin Lesar, and a slew of disenfranchised citizens to protest not only the actions of the ruling government, but the very way that government and citizens have engaged each other in the years since the end of the war in 1995. In an act of defiance towards the entire class of ruling elites, protesters on Wednesday night burned both the flag of the ruling HDZ party, as well as the flag of the main opposition SDP (Social Democratic Party of Croatia).
Many Croatian politicians have been quick to judge this as indexical of the ‘radical’ or ‘extremist’ elements at work amongst the protesters, outside commentators have worried about the structural ‘right-wing’ or ‘fascist’ implications of these acts. And it is true that the state of Croatia has much work to do in dealing with nationalism and hate speech amongst its citizens. These acts of flag burning however were key for exactly opposite reasons: they did signal a new and particular kind of solidarity amongst demonstrators, but it had nothing to do with a realignment of contemporary Croatian politics. Rather, it was a class solidarity, and a recognition of class solidarity above other kinds of divisions. Furthermore, the flag burning was directed not only against political elites in the state of Croatia, but against the fact that, in Croatia, political elites are synonymous with class elites. A common joke in Croatia goes along the following lines: a young boy says to his mom “Mom, when I grow up, I’m going to be rich and shower you with gifts, travel all over the place, meet celebrities and hang out with soccer players and live in a palace.” The mom says “Oh, and what will you be then when you grow up?” “A politician” answers the boy.
Protesters too have been quick to point out the lavish lifestyles of many of Croatia’s politicians. The discovery earlier this week that Ivo Sanader, former Croatian Prime Minister who is currently awaiting trial for the Hypo bank affair in Austria, received a commission of 3.5 million Croatian Kuna in the negotiations with Hypo, has done more than any one single affair to consolidate the loose alliances amongst protesters created via newspaper websites, Facebook pages, Twitter feeds, talk on the streets and phone calls between family members. Croatian media reports have come back to the claim that protesters do not have an agenda or an end goal, however, the class agenda here seems very clear. At the protests following Saturday’s initial veterans’ demonstrations, banners and posters held by participants in the cold Zagreb winter displayed only economics statistics, personal experiences, food prices and contempt for elected officials.
The number of 350 000 officially unemployed in Croatia masks the tens of thousands who are employed but have not received a salary in six months; it masks the tens of thousands who are paid in a combination of cash and ‘store credits’ that they have to spend at particular grocery stores by a certain date; it masks the fact that many families have either only one or no income; it masks the fact that pensions are not enough for pensioners to live off of, and therefore most become dependent on their children for financial support; it masks the irregular arrival of both pension and disability cheques; it masks the growing credit crisis in a country where very few guarantors are left to sign the astonishing number of loan contracts, handed out irresponsibly by foreign banks. At the beginning of the week, Prime Minister Kosor met with large food producing and processing corporations, including Agrokor and Dukat, to make sure prices of basic foodstuffs would not rise. However, this reassurance will not do much for the large number of people who already cannot support the already exorbitant food economy (nor will it do much for the Croatian politicians' ever-expanding and exorbitant waist lines).
Though some have drawn a line of connection between these protests in Croatia and the uprisings in progress in the North African and Middle East region, it is more important to put all of these protests and uprisings in the larger context of the economic programs, international geopolitics and financing of the (at least) past 20 years.
Though international media have barely touched the current situation in Croatia, domestic newspapers have been overflowing with statements from Croatia’s government officials (coincidentally, the fewest number of statements have come from the HDZ Prime Minister, Jadranka Kosor, who has been the most prominent target of demonstrators). The largest trend amongst these statements has been the call to ‘order’ and ‘moderation,’ and the simultaneous portrayal of protesters by HDZ officials, amongst others, as ‘hooligans’ and ‘troublemakers.’ Earlier this week, HDZ member and former presidential candidate Andrija Hebrang accused the opposition of paying each protester 250 Croatian Kuna to rid the protests of their peaceful character. The president of the opposition SDP, Zoran Milanović reiterated “we are not Libya, we will not hand over power in the streets.” Most common of all however has been an underhanded and veiled public threat promoted by a range of political actors that these protests will threaten Croatia’s European Union ascension bid. Yesterday Milanović reiterated “the talks with the EU must be finalized, we all know what the dynamic is towards that goal.”
The veiled threats over EU ascension have been coupled with foreshadowings of an even more grim general economic situation. Minister of Tourism Damir Bajs warned the public that they were endangering the upcoming potentially lucrative tourist season with their protests. He stated in public that “there have not been many questions from foreign news reporters, and let’s hope it stays that way.” Deputy Prime Minister Domagoj Ivan Milošević called reporters to a briefing and said that “protests affect the investment climate very negatively,” and continued to reiterate that “we will be entering the EU soon. All this might be slowed by the protests.”
The demand for stability, economic success and the answering of class grievances has for many years in Croatia been equated with the question of EU membership. Since the beginning of Ivo Sanader’s government, the HDZ has ruthlessly pursued EU membership at all costs, and as a remedy to all problems, political, economic and social, in Croatia. All government officials have resorted to the language of order, progress, incrementalism and, most importantly, moderation in pursuit of this goal. Similarly, all dominant parties in the European Parliament (EP) have reinforced this language through their own teleological narrative of EU ascension.
The signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995 might be marked both as the culmination of years of regional intervention and humanitarianism, but also the beginning of these particular narratives of statehood. Marked at first as a state ‘in market transition’ away from socialism following the collapse of Yugoslavia, then as a post-conflict state ‘in transition’ to the cosmopolitan profile of the EU members, Croatia’s position is not unique in the region. Indeed, all the former Yugoslav states have been discussed within the ideological framework of the social and political maturity of the European family of nations on the one hand, and of the Balkans’ developmental ‘handicaps’ and peripheral condition, at the edges of EU membership, on the other hand. In a stunning complement to Croatian President Ivo Josipović’s declaration that protesters “offended Zagreb with their savagery,” Jadranka Kosor, in her speech yesterday at the opening of the centrist-right European People’s Party Congress in the European Parliament stated that “we will do our job, and proudly, with head held-high, enter the European Union and return home to the circle of European Civilizations.” Both thereby implicitly contrasted current Croatian society as ‘primitive’ and ‘backwards,’ not a part of ‘European civilization,’ with the almost messianic possibilities offered by the ‘cultured’ European factors.
The purpose of this brief digression has not been to promote or justify violent behavior amongst protesters. To the contrary, the protests have been remarkable precisely for their peacefulness. On Wednesday, many protesters threw tulips at the feet of Zagreb riot police controlling the event, and chanted “we love you” in a chorus to the officers. Rather, my goal is to stress how politicians' language of moderation, order, progress, culture, and has been at odds with what Asli Bali and Aziz Rana in an article on “The Fake Moderation of America’s Moderate Mideast Allies” for ‘Foreign Policy in Focus’ call “any tangible commitment to actual moderation – understood as an internal project of democratization or political openness.” Since the announcement that there would be protests every other day until the government resigned, the protests have been characterized by the very qualities extolled by moderate pro-Western factions: a dedicated focus on human rights and the right of the majority to choose its elected officials.
These events in Croatia, and reactions to these events highlight what Bali and Rana call “the falseness” of the chaos-order dichotomy as the frame through which we must understand the events in Croatia. The chaos-order dichotomy has been more than complementary to both playing on citizens’ fears of a stumble back to so-called atavistic conflict, as well as the fear that Croatia may never enjoy the ‘stability’ ensured by entry into the geopolitical playground promised by NATO and the EU.
But more than anything, the chaos-order dichotomy has been most crucial for the installation and manufacture of politicians of ‘moderation’ in the years since Dayton. The politicians ‘of moderation’ have effectively, through their installation as the beacons of moderation and as harbingers of European membership, both assured and strengthened their own legitimacy in the eyes of European and “Western” powers. Simultaneously, the legitimacy offered to these politicians of moderation by “Western” powers has discursively prevented critique from a disenfranchised, increasingly impoverished population. Despite their façade of democratization and the discourse of ‘local commitments,’ these political elites have created a state that is extremely corrupt, that can no longer fiscally carry the theft its politicians have orchestrated, and a state apparatus that has placed itself in a class position that the average citizen cannot relate to.
The burning of the EU flag that took place on Wednesday night might then be read also as citizens taking a stand against the legitimacy of domestic politicians who have narrativized the EU ascension process, and who, for most of Croatia’s citizens, represent European legitimacy in the Croatian public sphere.
What brings together the Croatian case with other protests in the Middle East region might best be summarized not by the transition from ‘autocracy’ to ‘democracy’ nor by the transition from ‘socialism’ to ‘capitalism.’ Rather, Croatia, along with the other former Yugoslav states, has been, in the past 20 years characterized by the transition from decades of non-aligned policies and politics to the current ‘interventionist’ world order, where local rulers rule longest (and with most legitimacy) if they tow the dominant (whether it be Europeanist or Americanist) geopolitical line. The air of moderation and rhetorical talent of most of these leaders has for years masked the pillage of national treasures, treasuries’ reserves, natural resources, industry and individual citizens’ lives.
Right now, over 10000 protesters have gathered in Zagreb, and their numbers are growing even larger. Their demands are far from ‘hazy’ or ‘disarticulated.’ To the contrary, their demands are clear. The current ruling government must step down. The current prime minister and her cabinet must step down from their positions. Early elections need to be convened. And a new era of class politics, of realigned political concern to local situations, must be recognized in Croatia, and in the wider region as the key to long-term stability.
Sabrina Perić is a doctoral candidate in social anthropology at Harvard University.
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